The Algorithmic Origins of Life by Walker, Sara Imari & Davies, Paul C. W.
ar
X
iv
:1
20
7.
48
03
v2
  [
nli
n.A
O]
  2
2 O
ct 
20
12
The Algorithmic Origins of Life
Sara Imari Walker1,2,3 and Paul C.W. Davies2
1NASA Astrobiology Institute
2 BEYOND: Center for Fundamental Concepts in Science
Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ
3 Blue Marble Space Institute of Science, Seattle, WA
Abstract
Although it has been notoriously difficult to pin down precisely what it is that makes life so distinctive
and remarkable, there is general agreement that its informational aspect is one key property, perhaps the
key property. The unique informational narrative of living systems suggests that life may be characterized
by context-dependent causal influences, and in particular, that top-down (or downward) causation –
where higher-levels influence and constrain the dynamics of lower-levels in organizational hierarchies –
may be a major contributor to the hierarchal structure of living systems [7, 8, 58]. Here we propose that
the origin of life may correspond to a physical transition associated with a shift in causal structure, where
information gains direct, and context-dependent causal efficacy over the matter it is instantiated in. Such
a transition may be akin to more traditional physical transitions (e.g. thermodynamic phase transitions),
with the crucial distinction that determining which phase (non-life or life) a given system is in requires
dynamical information and therefore can only be inferred by identifying causal architecture. We discuss
some potential novel research directions based on this hypothesis, including potential measures of such a
transition that may be amenable to laboratory study, and how the proposed mechanism corresponds to
the onset of the unique mode of (algorithmic) information processing characteristic of living systems.
1 Introduction
A landmark event in the history of science was the publication in 1859 by Charles Darwin of his book
On the Origin of Species [17], affording for the first time in history a scientific framework unifying all
life on Earth under a common descriptive paradigm. However, while Darwin’s theory gives a convincing
explanation of how life has evolved incrementally over billions of years from simple microbes to the
richness of the biosphere we observe today, Darwin pointedly left out an account of how life first emerged,
“One might as well speculate about the origin of matter”, he quipped. A century and a half later,
scientists still remain largely in the dark about life’s origins. It would not be an exaggeration to say that
the origin of life is one of the greatest unanswered questions in science.
The origin of life constitutes three related but distinct questions: when, where and how did it happen?
Progress toward understanding the first two has been markedly more successful than the third. Here we
sidestep the when and where issues, which have been extensively discussed elsewhere (see e.g. [60, 49]),
and address what is arguably the hardest and least constrained of the three origins questions: how
did life begin? Of the many open questions surrounding how life emerges from non-life, perhaps the
most challenging is the vast gulf between complex chemistry and the simplest biology: even the smallest
mycoplasma is immeasurably more complex than any chemical reaction network we might engineer in
the laboratory with current technology. The chemist George Whitesides, for example, has stated, “How
remarkable is life? The answer is: very. Those of us who deal in networks of chemical reactions know
of nothing like it” [85]. The heart of the issue is that we do not know whether the living state is “just”
very complex chemistry, or if there is something fundamentally distinct about living matter. Right at
the outset we therefore face a deep conceptual problem, one asked long ago by the physicist Erwin
Schro¨dinger [68], namely, What is Life? Without a definition for life, the problem of how life began is
not well posed.
Often the issue of defining life is sidestepped by assuming that if one can build a simple chemical
system capable of Darwinian evolution then the rest will follow suit and the problem of life’s origin will
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de facto be solved [44]. Although few are willing to accept a simple self-replicating molecule as living,
the assumption is that after a sufficiently long period of Darwinian evolution this humble replicator will
eventually be transformed into an entity complex enough that it is indisputably living [42]. Darwinian
evolution applies to everything from simple software programs, molecular replicators, and memes, to
systems as complex as multicellular life and even potentially the human brain [30] – therefore spanning a
gamut of phenomena ranging from artificial systems, to simple chemistry, to highly complex biology. The
power of the Darwinian paradigm is precisely its capacity to unify such diverse phenomena, particularly
across the tree of life – all that is required are the well-defined processes of replication with variation, and
selection. However, this very generality is also the greatest weakness of the paradigm as applied to the
origin of life: it provides no means for distinguishing complex from simple, let alone life from non-life.
This may explain Darwin’s own reluctance to speculate on the subject.
Although it is notoriously hard to identify precisely what makes life so distinctive and remarkable
[14, 78, 5], there is general agreement that its informational aspect is one key property, and perhaps
the key property [76, 48, 86, 38]. The manner in which information flows through and between cells
and sub-cellular structures is quite unlike anything else observed in nature. If life is more than just
complex chemistry, its unique informational management properties may be the crucial indicator of this
distinction, which raises the all-important question of how the informational properties characteristic of
living systems arose in the first place. This key question of origin may be satisfactorily answered only
by first having a clear notion of what is meant by “biological information”. Unfortunately, the way that
information operates in biology is not easily characterized [48, 56]. While standard information-theoretic
measures, such as Shannon information [72], have proved useful, biological information has an additional
quality which may roughly be called “functionality” – or “contextuality” – that sets it apart from a
collection of mere bits as characterized by Shannon Information content. Biological information shares
some common ground with the philosophical notion of semantic information (which is more commonly
– and rigorously – applied in the arena of “high-level” phenomena such as language, perception and
cognition) [56]. The challenge presented by requiring that one appeals to global context confounds
any attempt to define biological information in terms of local variables alone, and suggests something
fundamentally distinct about how living systems process information. In this paper, we postulate that it
is the transition to context-dependent causation – mediated by the onset of information control – that
is the key defining characteristic of life. We therefore identify the transition from non-life to life with
a fundamental shift in the causal structure of the system, specifically, a transition to a state in which
algorithmic information gains direct, context-dependent, causal efficacy over matter.
2 Life and Information
The concept of information has gained a prominent role in many areas of biology. Biologists routinely
use terms such as “signaling”, “quorum sensing”, and “reading” or “writing” genetic information, while
genes are described as being “transcribed”, “translated”, and “edited”, all implying that in a biological
context an informational narrative well captures the principal modes of activity and causal relationships.
However, biological molecules are also physical objects, and like their non-biological counterparts, they
may be described at the molecular (as opposed to system) level by a mechanical narrative. Obviously
these parallel causal accounts, which appeal to different language and different concepts, must neverthe-
less fit together. Reconciling them is impeded by the fact that the precise nature of biological information
remains vague and difficult to define (see e.g. [34] for a detailed discussion). The information content
of DNA, for example, is usually defined by the Shannon (sequential) measure. However, the genome is
only a small part of the biological information story. DNA is not a blueprint for an organism1: no infor-
mation is actively processed by DNA alone [57]. Rather, DNA is a passive repository for transcription of
stored data into RNA, some (but by no means all) of which goes on to be translated into proteins. The
biologically relevant information stored in DNA therefore has very little to do with its specific chemical
nature (beyond the fact that it is a digital linear polymer). The genetic material could just as easily be a
different variety of nucleic acid (or a different molecule altogether), as recently experimentally confirmed
[64]. It is the functionality of the expressed RNAs and proteins that is biologically important.
Functionality, however, is not a local property of a molecule [2]. It is defined only relationally, in
a global context, which includes networks of relations among many sub-elements. For example, the
functionality of expressed RNA and protein sequences is clearly context-dependent – only an exceedingly
1Whereas a blueprint provides a one-to-one correspondence between the symbolic representation and the actual object it
describes, DNA does not contain all of the information necessary to reconstruct an organism [74]. For example, many post-
translational modifications as well as self-assembling components (i.e. lipids) are not encoded in the genome.
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small subset of these molecules are causally efficacious (i.e. meaningful) in the larger biochemical network
of a cell whose functioning is dependent on conditions such as salinity of the cytoplasm, pH, etc. That
milieu includes other expressed proteins, RNAs, metabolites, and a host of other molecules, the spatial
distribution of which is crucial to their individual causal roles. A priori, it is not possible to determine
which will be functional in a cell based on local structure and sequence information alone2. One is
therefore left to conclude that the most important features of biological information (i.e. functionality)
are decisively nonlocal. Biologically functional information is therefore not an additional quality, like
electric charge, painted onto matter and passed on like a token. It is of course instantiated in biochemical
structures, but one cannot point to any specific structure in isolation and say “Aha! Biological information
is here!”. Although the global and contextual nature of biological information has been widely recognized
and discussed for some time [40], we have only just begun unraveling the details of how cells (and larger
organisms) organize and manage information [59]. The organization and information protocols for the
epigenome and connectome, for example, remain little understood, and clearly involve a huge variety of
regulatory RNAs and proteins. The recently published results of the ENCODE project, which provides
an encyclopedia of human DNA elements [1], provides a glimpse of the complexity involved in mapping
the function of the human genome.
Because complex non-linear systems are inherently prone to be unstable, organisms function only
by being subject to regulation [12], via a host of information control mechanisms that are themselves
disseminated throughout the organism. It is the suite of regulatory molecules involved in information
control that dictates the operating mode (e.g. phenotype) of a cell. Consider the genome and proteome
systems. The current state – i.e. the relative level of gene expression – depends on the composition
of the proteome, environmental factors, signaling molecules etc. that collectively act to up or down
regulate individual genes. Such complex feedback loops serve to determine the future state of the system.
Linear causal chains are rarely apparent; rather causation is distributed throughout the state of the
system as a whole (including information contained in the relations among all of the subcomponents).
Similar dynamics are at play throughout the informational hierarchies of biological organization, from
the epigenome [21], to quorum sensing and inter-cellular signaling in biofilms, to the use of signaling and
language to determine social group behavior [31].
In all of these cases where appeal is made to an informational narrative, we encounter context- (state-)
dependent causation. In this respect, biological systems are quite unlike traditional mechanical systems
evolving according to fixed laws of physics. In biological causation, subject to informational control and
feedback, the dynamical rules will generally change with time in a manner that is both a function of
the current state and the history of the organism [37, 36] (suggesting perhaps that even the concept
of evolution itself may be in need of revision see e.g. Goldenfeld and Woese [36, 35] for an insightful
discussion). A system in which the underlying rules (or laws) and the states both change with time
in an interdependent way represents a decisive break with traditional Newtonian dynamics, rooted in
immutable laws, and opens up the possibility of novel pathways to emergent complexity that are as yet
largely unexplored.
The central position of information in biology is not itself especially new or radical [76, 48, 86]. What
is often sidestepped, however, is the fact that in biological systems information is not merely a way to
label states, but a property of the system. To be explicit, biological information is distinctive because
it possesses a type of causal efficacy [3, 26] - it is the information that determines the current state and
hence the dynamics (and therefore also the future state(s)).3 We now turn to the question of how all
this came about. How did information first gain causal purchase over certain complex systems that we
now call living organisms?
3 Information in the Origin(s) of Life: Traditional Ap-
proaches
A longstanding debate – often dubbed the chicken or the egg problem – is which came first, genetic
heredity or metabolism [60, 49]? A conundrum arises because neither can operate without the other
2While some algorithms are becoming efficient at predicting structure, biological functionality is always determined by
insertion in a cell, or inferred by comparison to known structures.
3The question of whether a causal chain expressed in informational language at the system level can ultimately be reduced,
at least in principle, to a mechanistic causal chain at the molecular level, is the subject of a longstanding debate, complicated by
the fact that biological systems are always open. We make no attempt to engage this notorious philosophical topic here, because
it is irrelevant for the present discussion whether information is in fact a fundamental causal agent (which would represent a
radical departure from standard physics), or may be treated merely phenomenologically as an effective causal agent.
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in contemporary life, where the duality is manifested via the genome/proteome systems. The origin
of life community has therefore tended to split into two camps, loosely labeled as “genetics–first” and
“metabolism–first”. In informational language, genetics and metabolism may be unified under a com-
mon conceptual framework by regarding metabolism as a form of analog information processing (to be
explained below), to be contrasted to the digital information of genetics. In approaching this debate,
a common source of confusion stems from the fact that molecules play three distinct roles: structural,
informational and chemical. To use computer language, in living systems chemistry corresponds to hard-
ware and information (e.g. genetic and epigenetic) to software [18]. The chicken-or-egg problem, as
traditionally posed, thus amounts to a debate of whether analog or digital hardware came first.
3.1 A Digital Origin for Life
The “genetics-first” paradigm, identifying a digital information repository as the most essential feature
of the first living systems, is favored by biological approaches to the origin of life, which extrapolate
backward in time from the properties of modern organisms. A widely accepted resolution to the seemingly
inextricable duality of genotype/phenotype is that the modern “DNA-protein” world evolved from simpler
precursor system involving only one major molecular species that played both the role of information
carrier and of enzymatic catalyst. In modern organisms, RNA is a biochemical mediator, enabling the
translation of DNA to protein. RNA is unique in that it can fill both roles, acting as both a genetic
polymer and biochemical catalyst, with novel expanded roles for functional RNAs continually being
discovered. This has led to the popular “RNA world” hypothesis, where all known life is posited to have
descended from an ancestral population of organisms that utilized RNA as their sole major biopolymer
prior to the advent of DNA and protein [33, 9, 43, 66, 32].
Despite the conceptual elegance of the RNA world, the hypothesis faces problems, primarily due
to the immense challenge of synthesizing RNA nucleotides under plausible prebiotic conditions and the
susceptibility of RNA oligomers to degradation via hydrolysis [53, 73, 75]. Some of the chemical difficulties
are alleviated if RNA was preceded by an alternative genetic polymer such as peptide nucleic acid (PNA)
[15] or threose nucleic acid (TNA) [61] (for other examples of candidate primitive genetic polymers see
e.g. [29]). In genetics-first origin of life scenarios, it has therefore been suggested that early-life may have
undergone a “hardware upgrade” (or a succession of upgrades), eventually transitioning from a proto-
RNA genetic polymer (or even an inorganic substrate [6, 19]) into a RNA-based biochemistry at a later
stage in its evolutionary history. This system would then have undergone further hardware upgrades or
“genetic-takeovers” to arrive at the DNA–protein world we observe today [51].
However, beyond the chemical difficulties associated with synthesis and stability of primitive genetic
polymers [28], lies a deeper conceptual challenge within the “digital–first” picture. As remarked above,
the proteome – and in fact nearly all biochemical interactions in the cell – process information in an
analog format, i.e. through chemical reactions which rely on continuous rates. For example, much
of the information digitally stored in DNA must be first transcribed and translated before it becomes
algorithmically meaningful in the context of the cell where it is then processed as analog information
through protein interaction networks. Focusing strictly on digital storage therefore neglects this critical
aspect of how biological information is processed. As we discuss below, due to the organizational structure
of systems capable of processing algorithmic (instructional) information, it is not at all clear that a
monomolecular system – where a single polymer plays the role of catalyst and informational carrier – is
even logically consistent with the organization of information flow in living systems, because there is no
possibility of separating information storage from information processing (that being such a distinctive
feature of modern life). As such, digital–first systems (as currently posed) represent a rather trivial form
of information processing that fails to capture the logical structure of life as we know it.
3.2 An Analog Origin for Life
In contrast to models that rely on extrapolating backward in time from extant biology, approaches that
move forward from what is known of the geochemical conditions on the primitive Earth typically favor
an analog format for the first living systems. In analog chemical systems, information is contained in a
continuously-variable composition of an assembly of molecules rather than in a discrete string of digital
bits. “Metabolism-first” scenarios for the origin of life fall within this analog framework, positing that
early life was based on autocatalytic metabolic cycles that would have been constructed in a manner akin
to how analog computer systems are cabled together to execute a specific problem-solving task [22, 45].
The appeal of such metabolism-first scenarios is that the chemical building blocks - ranging from lipids
[69], to peptides [41, 50, 13], to iron-sulfide complexes [83, 67] - are usually much easier to synthesize
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under abiotic conditions than any known candidate genetic polymer and would have therefore been much
more abundant on the prebiotic Earth. The heritable information in this case typically consists of the
compositional ratios of the molecules in the organized assemblies. Although it has been suggested that
such “composomes” might provide a primitive inheritance mechanism [70, 71], it is not clear that they
are evolvable, since compositional information tends to degrade over successive generations inhibiting
the capacity for open-ended evolution [81] (see [55] for a recent discussion of how such systems could
be evolvable if possessing excess mutual catalysis). Therefore informational inheritance is not nearly as
clear cut here as it is in the digital picture.
Additionally, in the analog-first picture there exists a deeper issue of (re)programmability and with the
difficulty of maintaining orthogonal (i.e. non-interacting and thus non-interfering) reactions in strictly
analog reaction networks. Analog computers fell out of favor in the mid-20th century due to issues of
universality - analog devices, regardless of their structure, are much more difficult to engineer to solve
broad categories of problem than their digital counterparts. As we discuss below, all known life achieves
universality (at least in a limited sense) by utilizing the digital sequence structure of informational
polymers. Such universality would be exceedingly difficult to engineer in an analog-only system given
the challenges associated with building reaction networks where each (programmed) reaction is chemically
orthogonal to all other reactions. Orthogonality is, by comparison, relatively easy to achieve with digitized
switches. Control is therefore much easier to achieve in an analog system with digital switches than in
a solely analog system. Taking all of these factors into account, it is clear that analog-only systems
are not capable of adaptation in the same way as living systems are. Modern life is a hybrid: digital
memory and digital switches enable control over many (non-interfering) analog states, and therefore
enable adaptability to changing environmental conditions with the same basic toolkit. This is another
way of stating - in informational terms - that analog-only systems are not as versatile or as robust as
analog systems with digital information control and as such may likely have very limited evolutionary
capacity [12].
4 Redefining the Problem: An Algorithmic Origin for Life
By the above considerations, it seems that digital or analog alone is insufficient to provide a satisfactory
account of the origin of life – not just on technical grounds, but for deep conceptual reasons. The former
suffers from difficulties of prebiotic synthesis and due to fundamental limitations on how information can
be processed in such scenarios (being trivial rather than nontrivial); whereas the latter suffers from issues
of reprogrammability, control, and potentially long-term evolvability. This dilemma forms the crux of
the chicken-or-egg problem cited above and suggests that focusing solely on the debate over chemical
hardware may be limiting progress. An implicit assumption of these traditional approaches has been
that, while information may be manifested in particular chemical structures (digital or analog), it has no
autonomy. As such, information – though widely acknowledged as a key hallmark of life – thus far, has
played only a passive role in studies of life’s emergence. Instead, hardware has dominated the discussion,
in accordance with the generally reductionist flavor of biology in recent decades, with its associated
assumption that, ultimately, all life is nothing but chemistry.
However, as stressed above, a rigorous distinction between life and non-life is most likely to derive
from the distinctive mode of information management and control displayed by living systems, i.e. that
in biology information is causally efficacious. Both the traditional digital-first and analog-first viewpoints
neglect the active (algorithmic or instructional) and distributed nature of biological information. In our
view, an explanation of life’s origin is fundamentally incomplete in the absence of an account of how
the unique causal role played by information in living systems first emerged. In other words, we need
to explain the origin of both the hardware and software aspects of life, or the job is only half finished.
Explaining the chemical substrate of life and claiming it as a solution to life’s origin is like pointing to
silicon and copper as an explanation for the goings-on inside a computer. It is this transition where one
should expect to see a chemical system literally take-on “a life of its own”, characterized by informational
dynamics which become decoupled from the dictates of local chemistry alone (while of course remaining
fully consistent with those dictates). Thus the famed chicken-or-egg problem (a solely hardware issue) is
not the true sticking point. Rather, the puzzle lies with something fundamentally different, a problem of
causal organization having to do with the separation of informational and mechanical aspects into parallel
causal narratives. The real challenge of life’s origin is thus to explain how instructional information control
systems emerge naturally and spontaneously from mere molecular dynamics. It is this issue which we
explore in the remainder of this paper.
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5 Turing, von Neumann and Undecidability in the Origin
of Life
The instructional, or algorithmic, nature of biological information was long ago identified as a key prop-
erty, and an early attempt to formalize it was made by von Neumann. He approached the problem by
asking whether it was possible to build a machine that could construct any physical system, including
itself. Identifying the parallels between biological systems – such as the human nervous system – and
computers, and drawing inspiration from Turing’s work on universal computation, he sought a formal-
ism that would include both natural and artificial systems [82]. Turing showed that it was possible to
build a device – now known as a universal Turing machine – which, given a sufficient amount of time,
could output any computable function [80]. A Turing machine is relatively simple hypothetical device,
consisting of a machine and an unlimited memory capacity taking the form of an infinite tape marked
out into squares, on each of which a symbol may be printed or erased, sequentially. A key feature of
Turing machines is that both the state of the machine and the current symbol on the tape being read
in, are necessary to determine the future evolution of the system. As such, the algorithm encoded on
the tape plays a prominent role in the time evolution of the state of the machine. At least superficially,
this appears to be very similar to the case presented by biological systems where the update rules change
in response to information read out from the current state (as we discuss below, both are an example
of top-down causation via information control). However, it is not obvious exactly how Turing’s very
abstract formalism might map onto biological systems. This was the problem von Neumann wished to
solve.
By analogy with Turing’s universal machine, he therefore devised an abstraction called a universal-
constructor (UC), a machine capable of taking materials from its host environment to build any possible
physical structure (consistent with the available resources and the laws of physics) including itself. An
important feature of UCs is that they operate on universality classes4 . In principle, a UC is capable of
constructing any object within a given universality class (including itself, if it is a member of the relevant
class). An example of such a universality class relevant to biological systems is the set of all possible
sequences composed of the natural set of twenty amino acids found in proteins. The relevant UC in this
case is the translation machinery of modern life, including the ribosome and associated tRNAs along with
an array of protein assistants5. This system can, in principle, construct any possible peptide sequence
composed of the coded amino acids (with minor variations across the tree of life as to what constitutes
a coded amino acid [46]).
The UC forms the foundation of von Neumann’s theory on self-replicating automata. However, a
UC is a mindless robot, and must be told very specifically exactly what to do in order build the correct
object(s). It must therefore be programmed to construct specific things, and if it is to replicate then
it must also be provided with a blueprint of itself 6. However, as von Neumann recognized, implicit in
this seemingly innocuous statement is a deep conceptual difficulty concerning the well-known paradoxes
of self-reference [39, 65]. To avoid an infinite regress, in which the blueprint of a self-replicating UC
contains the blueprint which contains the blueprint . . . ad infinitum, von Neumann proposed that in the
biological case the blueprint must play a dual role: it should contain instructions - an algorithm - to
make a certain kind of machine (e.g. the UC) but should also be blindly copied as a mere physical
structure, without reference to the instructions its contains, and thus reference itself only indirectly. This
dual hardware/software role mirrors precisely that played by DNA, where genes act both passively as
physical structures to be copied, and are actively read-out as a source of algorithmic instructions. To
implement this dualistic role, von Neumann appended a “supervisory unit” to his automata whose task
is to supervise which of these two roles the blueprint must play at a given time, thereby ensuring that the
blueprint is treated both as an algorithm to be read–out and as a structure to be copied, depending on the
context. In this manner, the organization of a von Neumann automaton ensures that instructions remain
logically differentiated from their physical representation. To be functional over successive generations, a
complete self-replicating automaton must therefore consist of three components: a UC, an (instructional)
blueprint, and a supervisory unit.
To rough approximation, all known life contains these three components, which is particularly re-
markable, given that von Neumann formulated his ideas before the discoveries of modern molecular
4Here we define a universality class as the set of all possible objects that can be made from a given set of building blocks
5The mapping between extant life and a von Neumann automaton is rather loose. In particular, the relevant UC here (i.e.
the ribosome) is not included in the universality class it operates on and it therefore does not directly construct itself. There
are a host of distributed control mechanisms and self-assembly processes that contribute to the reproduction of an entire cell.
6Likewise a UC can construct any other object within its universality class if fed the appropriate instruction to do so.
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biology, including the structure of DNA and the ribosome. From the insights provided by molecular
biology over the past 50 years, we can now identify that all known life functions in a manner akin to
von Neumann automaton, where DNA provides a (partial) algorithm, ribosomes act as the core of the
universal constructor and DNA polymerases (along with a suite of other molecular machinery) play the
role of supervisory unit7 [65, 54].
In spite of the striking similarities between a UC and modern life, there are some important differ-
ences. DNA does not contain a blueprint for building the entire cell, but instead contains only small
parts of a much larger biological algorithm, that may be roughly described as the epigenetic components
of an organism. The algorithm for building an organism is therefore not only stored in a linear digital
sequence (tape), but also in the current state of the entire system (e.g. epigenetic factors such as the
level of gene expression, post-translational modifications of proteins, methylation patterns, chromatin
architecture, nucleosome distribution, cellular phenotype, and environmental context). The algorithm
itself is therefore highly delocalized, distributed inextricably throughout the very physical system whose
dynamics it encodes. Moreover, although the ribosome provides a rough approximation for a universal
constructor (see footnote 5), universal construction in living cells requires a host of distributed mech-
anisms for reproducing an entire cell. Clearly in an organism the algorithm cannot be decomposed
and stored in simple sequential digital form to be read out by an appropriate machine in the manner
envisioned by Turing and von Neumann for their devices.
Although the elements of von Neumann’s UC cannot be put in a one-to-one correspondence with a
living organism, the UC does provide a key insight into the nature of life, by directing attention to the
logical structure of information processing and control, and information flow in living systems.
5.1 Trivial versus Nontrivial Self-Replication
Although von Neumann automata are self-replicators, their mode of replication is non-trivial in a fun-
damental, logical, sense, and should be distinguished from trivial replicators such as crystals, viruses,
computer viruses, nonenzymatic template replicators, lipid composomes, and Penrose blocks [63]. Cast
in the language of the previous section, trivial replicators process information strictly in the passive sense.
Typically, they are characterized by building blocks which are not much simpler than the assembled ob-
ject. Schro¨dinger recognized this key distinction in his take onWhat is Life? when he postulated that the
genetic material must be some sort of “aperiodic crystal” [68]. Algorithmic information theory can make
the foregoing distinction precise. The algorithmic information of a system or structure is defined to be
the Shannon information contained in the shortest algorithm that can specify the system or structure as
its output [47, 10, 11]. For example, a trivial replicator, such as a crystal, is one that may be specified by
an algorithm containing far fewer bits than the system it describes. In contrast, a non-trivial replicator
is algorithmically incompressible and requires an algorithm, or instruction set, of complexity comparable
to the system it describes (or creates).
A vast logical divide exists between trivial and nontrivial replicators because the former is not ex-
plicitly programmed. Instead, trivial replicators rely strictly on the implicit physics (and chemistry) of
the current environment to support replication. Therefore only a limited set of objects within a given
universality class is constructible. In other words, trivial self-replicating systems can only access one
instructional mode – the one which the system is currently operating in – and as such are capable of
only passive information handling. This stands in stark contrast to the case for nontrivial replicators,
where any possible object within a given universality class (as defined above) – including the UC – can
be constructed if the UC is provided with an appropriate instruction. Nontrivial replicators in some
sense harness the underlying laws of physics and chemistry to achieve a broader agenda (although of
course adhering to the constraints imposed by physical law). As such, only nontrivial replicators process
information in an active sense, enabling the possibility for the update rules to change in response to the
current informational state of the system (and vice versa). Because of this fundamental distinction in
how information is handled and processed, nontrivial and trivial replication are two logically and orga-
nizationally distinct possibilities for self-replicating physical systems. The challenge in explaining life’s
origin is to account for the transition between trivial and non-trivial replication, which entails more than
a mere leap in complexity, but a reconfiguration of the entire logical organization of the system.
7An important note is that the all-important dual role cited above is clearly implemented: DNA polymerases are oblivious
to the instructions that DNA contains and will blindly copy both coding and noncoding sequences.
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5.2 Algorithmic Takeover
Although modern life is clearly representative of the class of nontrivial self-replicators, the majority of
work on the origin of life has focused on the conceptually simpler case of trivial self-replication. This not
without good reason: the origin of translation – mediating what is known of the transition from trivial
to nontrivial8 – is notoriously difficult to pin down, amounting to an algorithmic takeover of information
stored in one molecular species (nucleic acids) that becomes operable over another structurally and
chemically very different species (peptides). The division of labor implicit in bimolecular life bestows one
very obvious and distinctive advantage; it enables the instructions to be physically separated and stored
away from the hardware that implements them. The “arm’s length” control implicit in this division is
exercised via a software channel - encoded transactions using messengers and specialized bilingual agents9
that identify, and are read by a system that can decode the instructions. Thus the algorithm inhabits
one molecular universe and its products inhabit another. We consider this separation to be one of the
hallmarks of life.
Although trivial self-replicators can undergo Darwinian evolution [23, 24], the lack of separation
between algorithm and implementation implies that mono-molecular systems are divided from known
life by a logical and organizational chasm that cannot be crossed by mere complexification of passive
hardware. In that respect we regard the case of the RNA world as currently understood as falling short
of being truly living. If primitive “life” was strictly monomolecular, there would be no way to physically
decouple information and control from the hardware it operates on, resulting in unreliable information
protocols due to noisy information channels. For this rather deep reason, it may be that life had to be
“bimolecular” from the start.
We point out a curious philosophical implication of the algorithmic perspective: if the origin of life
is identified with the transition from trivial to non-trivial information processing – e.g. from something
akin to a Turing machine capable of a single (or limited set of) computation(s) to a universal Turing
machine capable of constructing any computable object (within a universality class) – then a precise
point of transition from non-life to life may actually be undecidable in the logical sense. This would likely
have very important philosophical implications, particularly in our interpretation of life as a predictable
outcome of physical law.
6 The Origin of Life: A Transition in Causal Structure
We have argued that living and nonliving matter differ fundamentally in the way information is organized
and flows through the system: biological systems are distinctive because information manipulates the
matter it is instantiated in. This leads to a very different, context-dependent, causal narrative - with
causal influences running both up and down the hierarchy of structure of biological systems (i.e. from
state to dynamical rules and dynamical rules to the state) [7, 8, 58, 21]. In modern life, genes may be
up- or down-regulated by physical and chemical signals from the environment. For example, mechanical
stresses on a cell may affect gene expression. Mechanotransduction, electrical transduction and chemical
signal transduction – all well-studied biological processes – constitute examples of what philosophers
term “top-down causation”, where the system as a whole exerts causal control over a subsystem (e.g. a
gene) via a set of time-dependent constraints [3, 52, 20]. The onset of top-down information flow, perhaps
in a manner akin to a phase transition, may serve as a more precise definition of life’s origin than the
“separation of powers” discussed in the previous section. The origin of life may thus be identified when
information gains top-down causal efficacy over the matter that instantiates it. Top-down causation has
an extensive literature so will not be reviewed here (see i.e. [7, 8, 58, 3, 26, 20, 25, 27]).
We note, however, that there may be several different mechanisms for top-down causation, which come
into play at different hierarchical scales in nature [26]. As we have presented it here, the key distinction
between the origin of life and other “emergent” transitions is the onset of distributed information control,
enabling context-dependent causation, where an abstract and non-physical systemic entity (algorithmic
information) effectively becomes a causal agent capable of manipulating its material substrate [3, 26].
Although there is an extensive literature on top-down causation, particularly in biology, it has not
been explicitly applied to the origin of life as such. The framework presented in this paper provides a
8The informational narrative of life clearly goes beyond translation, however this is the one place in biology where we know
universality (at least in a limited sense) has taken hold. A complete mapping of epigenetic factors will likely uncover other
informational protocols at work in biological systems that may have some form of associated universality, and perhaps are even
more primitive.
9“Bilingual” here means tRNA molecules that recognize both the four-letter alphabet of nucleic acids and the twenty-letter
alphabet of amino acids.
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Hallmarks of Life
Global organization
Information as a causal agency
Top-down causation
Analog and digital information processing
Laws and states co-evolve
Logical structure of a universal constructor
Dual hardware and software roles of genetic material
Non-trivial replication
Physical separation of instructions (algorithms)
from the mechanism that implements them
Table 1: The hallmarks of life.
well-defined definition for the transition to life, drawing on the top-down concept within an informational
framework. Such a definition also addresses the vexed issue of what constitutes “almost life”. This is
essential for any theory that purports to chart a directional pathway from simple building blocks towards
progressively more “lifelike” states. It makes sense to try to explain life’s origin only if it resulted from
processes of moderately highly probability, so that we can reasonably expect to explain it in terms of
known science. It then follows from simple statistics that there will have been a large ensemble of systems
proceeding down the pathway toward life, and no obvious reason why only one member successfully
completed the journey. Ideally then, there should be a parameter, or more likely a set of parameters, to
quantify progress toward life. The causal efficacy of distributed information control, discussed throughout
this paper, provides a possible candidate parameter that includes the possibility of identifying states of
“almost life”.
Walker et al. (WCD) have recently proposed via a toy model, one possible candidate measure for
transitions in causal structure in biological hierarchies, using transfer entropy to study the flow of in-
formation from local to global and from global to local scales in a lattice of coupled logistic maps [84].
Nontrivial collective behavior was observed to emerge each time the dominant direction of information
flow shifted from bottom-up to top-down, indicating that top-down causation was in fact driving the
emergence of collectives. The particular dynamical system investigated was designed to parallel a hall-
mark of many major evolutionary transitions – the emergence of higher–level reproducers from previously
autonomous lower-level units [77]. In this framework, the origin of life would mark the first appearance
of this reversal in causal structure, and as such is a unique transition in the physical realm (marking
the transition from trivial to nontrivial information processing as discussed earlier). The utility of this
approach is that it provides a clear definition of what one should look for: a transition from bottom-up
to top-down causation and information flow.
The aforementioned simple model, while instructive, suffers from the fact that it cannot capture how
algorithmic information alters the update rules, and thus the future state of the system. A possible
refinement is provided by Tononi’s measure of so-called integrated information φ, based on network
topology [79]. This definition effectively captures the information generated by the causal interactions
of the sub-elements of a system, beyond that which is generated independently by its parts. It therefore
provides a measure of the distributed information generated by the network as a whole as a result
of its causal architecture. Integrated information (also called “excess information”) has recently been
successfully applied to measure emergence in cellular automata under appropriate coarse-grainings of the
dynamics [4]. A version of the theory whereby φ is in turn treated as a dynamical variable that then
may influence the underlying causal relations among sub-elements might provide a way of quantifying
the causal efficacy of information in the context discussed throughout this paper.
7 Conclusions
We have presented a framework for understanding the origin of life as a transition in causal structure,
and information management and control, whereby information gains causal efficacy over the matter it
is instantiated in. The hallmarks of living systems based on this approach as discussed in this paper are
summarized in Table 1. The advantage of this perspective is that it provides a foundation for identifying
the origin of life as a well-defined transition. In so doing, it forces new thinking in how life might
have arisen on a lifeless planet, by shifting emphasis to the origins of information control, rather than
– for example – the onset of Darwinian evolution or the appearance of autocatalytic sets (i.e. either
analog or digital that lack information control), which, although certainly important to the story of life’s
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emergence, do not rigorously define how/when life emerges as a function of chemical complexity. It also
permits a broader view of life, where the same underlying principles would permit understanding of living
systems instantiated in different chemical substrates (including potentially non-organic substrates). How
this transition occurs remains an open question. While we have stressed that Darwinian evolution lacks
a capacity to elucidate the physical mechanisms underlying the transition from non-life to life or to
distinguish nonliving from living, evolution of some sort must still drive this transition (even if it does
not define it). It is likely that nontrivial information processing systems with delocalized information are
more evolutionarily robust given that information can be preserved in the face of changing environmental
conditions due the physical separation of information and its material representation.
Purely analog life-forms could have existed in the past but are not likely to survive over geological
timescales without acquiring explicitly digitized informational protocols. Therefore life-forms that “go
digital” may be the only systems that survive in the long-run and are thus the only remaining product
of the processes that led to life. As such, the onset of Darwinian evolution in a chemical system was
likely not the critical step in the emergence of life. As we have discussed, trivially self-replicating systems
can accomplish this. Instead, the emergence of life was likely marked by a transition in information
processing capabilities. This transition should be marked by a reversal in the causal flow of information
from bottom-up only to a situation characterized by bi-directional causality. Methods to advance this
program include identifying the causal architecture of known biochemical networks by applying candidate
measures (such as φ, or other measures of causal architecture [62, 16]), and focusing on regulatory
networks (information control networks) in ancient biochemical pathways to identify the minimal network
architectures necessary to support the causal and informational narrative observed in extant life. A
major unsolved problem is to determine how information control emerges ab initio, for example in an
RNA world setting, from chemical kinetics, as well as how primitive control mechanisms might evolve
and become increasing refined after “algorithmic takeover” has occurred. Digitization may have been a
natural outcome of this process in reaction-networks that had once been primarily analog. At this point,
information would have become separated from its physical representation, permitting information to
become a causal influence in its own right, and the language of Turing and von Neumann would have
begun to apply. Characterizing the emergence of life as a shift in causal structure due to information
gaining causal efficacy over matter marks the origin of life as a unique transition in the physical realm.
It distinguishes nonliving dynamical systems, which display trivial information processing only, from
living systems (and the complex systems derivative of biological systems, such as computers) which
display nontrivial information processing as two logically and organizationally distinct kinds of dynamical
systems.
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